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Beyond Form
Lukács’s Turn to Revolutionary Praxis
It is widely acknowledged that the concept of 
form occupies a central position and constitutes 
a focal point in Georg Lukács’s early pre-Marxist 
work.1 The essays of the collection Die Seele und 
die Formen (1911) rely upon a diagnosis of the 
problematic character of modern culture as it is 
reflected in the formal problems of modern art. 
In its opposition to the formlessness of modern 
art caused by modern world view relativism, 
form appears »as the expression of an absolute, 
which is essentially located beyond the things 
and is inherently fulfilled, complete and unified«. 
Thus, the form represents the bourgeois reaction 
to the crisis and negativity (the »problematic« 
character) of modern society.2 Lukács’s only uto-
pia in Die Seele und die Formen is the utopia of 
form in the strict sense of the ›artistic form‹ (and 
not of an alleged wider »utopische Kultur«).3 
1 This contribution is a slightly reworked compilation of parts 
of the author’s study Georg Lukács’s Philosophy of Prax-
is. From Neo-Kantianism to Marxism (London/New York: 
Bloombury 2018).
2 See Asor Rosa: Der junge Lukács, pp. 97–98.
3 As claimed, e. g., in Grauer: Die entzauberte Welt, pp. 36–38.
The concept of form 
occupies a central 
position in Georg Lukács’s 
early aestheticist work. 
Nevertheless, Lukács was 
aware of the limits of form 
in its confrontation with 
everyday life. In his critical 
appraisal, he revealed these 
limits in regard to aesthetic 
and ethical form. Neither 
can penetrate the ordinary 
life of men and they, thus, 
entrap the individual in a 
solipsistic relation to the 
world. In his pre-Marxist 
period, Lukács searched for 
an alternative in a kind of 
practical mysticism. This 
turn allowed him to discover 
a path beyond formalism in 
revolutionary, transformative 
praxis. This is the very 
path that finally led him 
to his dialectical-practical 
understanding of Marxism.
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As has been correctly pointed out, in his early work Lukács moves in the 
direction of a strict aestheticism.4
However, what has not been equally stressed in the relevant litera-
ture is how critical Lukács’s notion of form was. Although Lukács eagerly 
participated in the quest for form that represented a wider trend among 
bourgeois intellectuals of that time, he clearly discerned the limits of the 
power of form in its confrontation with everyday life and established social 
institutions. Such limitations are firstly revealed through a critique of the 
aesthetic form that constitutes the basis of the utopian reality represented by 
the work of art. Lukács’s critique reveals the art’s incapability of penetrating 
the common life of men and its total isolation from everyday practice (see 
section 1). Secondly, the critique of form pertains to the limitations of an 
ethical formation of life, which tends to entrap the individual in the solip-
sistic consistency of mind (see section 2). During his pre-Marxist period, 
Lukács shifted his attention towards searching for a way out of formalism 
by turning to practice in the framework of a mystical ethics (see section 3). 
This turn allowed him to discover a path beyond formalism in revolutionary, 
transformative praxis (see section 4). This is the very path that finally led 
him to his dialectical-practical understanding of Marxism.
1. Aesthetic Utopian Reality and Its Critique
Lukács’s early essay on Kierkegaard from Die Seele und die Formen is based 
on the opposition of everyday life and form. In this essay, he explained why 
an unambiguous, utopian unity of form and content is not possible in life, 
but only in the field of art.5 In a similar way, in his essay on Die Metaphysik 
der Tragödie from the same volume, Lukács described life as »an anarchy 
of light and dark«, a formless sequence of experiences without inner ne-
cessity, which excludes anything unequivocal, complete and absolute that 
would represent »true life«.6 Thus, the tragic conflict between the »regular 
accidentality«7 of »ordinary life«8 and the »real necessity« of the essential 
4 Dannemann: Ursprünge, p. 44. On this strong aestheticist tendency of the young Lukács see 
Kavoulakos: Kritik; Kavoulakos: Literatur und Utopie.
5 Cf. Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 56 (Die Seele und die Formen, pp. 86–87).
6 Cf. ibid., pp. 175–176 (»Anarchie des Helldunkels«, »D as  Leben«, Die Seele und die Formen, 
pp. 327–329).
7 Ibid., p. 191 (»gesetzmäßige Zufälligkeit«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 359).
8 Ibid., p. 180 (»gewöhnliches Leben«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 337).
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or »lively life«9 cannot be practically resolved in the empirical world – it 
can only be represented through the integrated form in art, especially in 
the tragic drama.
The aestheticism that is characteristic of Lukács’s early period finds its 
theoretical foundation in his first great Ästhetik he worked on in Heidelberg. 
Lukács developed his aesthetic theory within the frame of the neo-Kantian 
advocacy of the autonomy of aesthetics against other value-spheres. As a 
result, his theory strongly criticized every tendency to a metaphysical in-
terpretation of aesthetics.10
In the first version of the Ästhetik on which Lukács worked between 
1912 and 1914, the work of art is presented as the realization of a kind of 
›coincidentia oppositorum‹, which thus represents the unity of value and 
experience, form and content, the universal-transindividual and the par-
ticular-individual. In this sense, art is the fulfillment of the human desire 
for unity of the most individual with the universal. Consequently, for men, 
works of art represent »a world of fulfillment«.11 By claiming that the forma-
tions of aesthetics have a symbolical character, Lukács adopted a fundamental 
pair of concepts of the wider current of romantic aesthetics. However, he 
altered its meaning in such a way that the »symbol« is understood as »the 
overall structure of the work of art«.12 At the same time, he explicitly re-
jected the connection between the concept of the symbol and the problems 
of metaphysics, to which classical German aesthetic idealism related it.13
In opposition to the allegorically constituted formations (e.g. in the 
field of ethics), the symbol achieves the reciprocal adjustment of form and 
content, so that they appear as inseparable and, at the same time, distinc-
tive elements, not reducible to each other. The relation between form and 
content structurally resembles their ›interpenetration‹. Thus, the work of 
art constitutes a utopian reality with the traits of independency, closeness, 
totality and infinity.14
For Lukács, the quasi divine nature of the work of art as a utopian reality 
is due to the fact that its formation is guided by a fundamental »standpoint« 
or »world-view«, on the basis of which its material is selected and the essen-
9 Ibid., p. 180 (»wirkliche Notwendigkeit«, »lebendiges Leben«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 336).
10 For an overview of Lukács’s early aesthetic theory, see: Kavoulakos: Ästhetizistische Kulturkritik 
und ethische Utopie, pp. 83–118, 203–238.
11 Lukács: Heidelberger Philosophie, pp. 54–55, translation K. K. In the original: »Welt der Erfül-
lung«.
12 Hoeschen: Das ›Dostojewski‹-Projekt, p. 175.
13 See ibid., pp. 176–182.
14 Cf. Lukács: Heidelberger Philosophie, pp. 87–88.
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tial is separated from the inessential – something impossible in everyday 
experienced reality. Through the procedure of constitutive ignorance of the 
elements that do not harmonize with the guiding »standpoint« the work 
reaches its internal homogenization.15 The characteristic independence and 
completeness of the work of art, its »free floating« above every particular 
experienced reality is due to precisely this »constitutive homogeneity« of its 
elements, the fact that they are all permeated by the form so as to constitute 
a »homogeneous formation«, i.e. an »internally complete system«.16
In the second version of his Ästhetik, on which he worked between 1916 
and 1918, Lukács describes this independency of the work of art on the ba-
sis of the »symbolic and formal«, aesthetic concept of »microcosm«.17 The 
work of art »is an integrated, complete and self-contained totality«,18 it is a
microcosm, the cosmic character of which […] is revealed in the fact that all that is pos-
sible in respect of its constitutive principles matures in it as reality, [in the fact] that the 
categories ›possible‹, ›real‹ and ›necessary‹ lose their distinctive meaning in it through 
their complete identification.19
Lukács describes the totalization achieved by the work of art through another 
remark: »[Τ]he problem of the thing in itself cannot be posed in aesthetics«, 
as »the world of aesthetic forms does not emerge out of chaos, […] their 
›production‹ does not draw upon the chaos«.20 In this view, the aesthetic 
sphere is not opposed to chaos, but to the »absolute nothing«, since what 
is not posited within the work of art is merely inexistent for it.21 On the 
contrary, what is contained in the work of art is embraced by a form, which 
15 Cf. ibid., p. 83, 85, translation K. K. In the original: »Standpunkt«.
16 All quotes from ibid., pp. 57–58, translation K. K. In the original: »das Freischwebende«, »kon-
stitutive Homogeneität«, »homogenen Gebildes«, »abgeschlossenes und immanent vollendetes 
System«.
17 Cf. Lukács: Heidelberger Ästhetik, pp. 110–111, translation K. K. In the original: »symbolisch 
und formell«, »Mikrokosmos«.
18 Ibid., p. 110, translation K. K. In the original: »in sich abgeschlossene, vollendete und selbstge-
nügsame Totalität«.
19 Ibid, p. 100, translation K. K. In the original: »Mikrokosmos, dessen kosmischer Charakter […] 
sich darin offenbart, daß alles, was von seinen konstitutiven Prinzipien aus möglich ist, in ihm 
zur Wirklichkeit reift, daß die Kategorien ›möglich‹, ›wirklich‹ und ›notwendig‹ in ihm den 
Sinn ihrer Unterscheidbarkeit durch vollendetes Identischwerden verlieren.«
20 Ibid., p. 59, translation K. K. In the original: »daß das Ding-an-sich-Problem in der Ästhetik 
nicht aufwerfbar ist, daß die Welt der ästhetischen Formen sich nicht vom Chaos abhebt, daß 
ihr ›erzeugen‹ nicht auf das Chaos zurückgreift«.
21 Cf. ibid., p. 61, translation K. K. In the original: »absolutes Nichts«.
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has become the »form of a concrete content, i.e. it does not only elevate it 
on the level of validity, but it becomes hereinafter inseparable from it«.22
In his early Ästhetik, Lukács explained that the principle of the »pri-
macy of content« over the form, the demand for a »materially authentic« 
(materialecht) – i.e. materially adjusted – form, in other words, the postu-
late of overcoming the »abstract transcendence of form must itself bring 
the concept of form close to the aesthetic element«23 and away from both, 
the allegorical formations of ethics and the formlessness of everyday life.
In fact, in the Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst (1912–1914), Lukács 
explicated the structure of the aesthetic sphere in terms of the necessary 
chasm between the subjectivity of experience and the objectivity of the 
work of art as the realization of artistic form.24 This chasm renders the 
communicative function of art impossible, according to which the artist 
purportedly discloses an experience of his to other subjects who receive 
and understand it. Thus, in the field of art the inadequacy between the 
communicative form and the experiential content that permeates human 
communication in general is simply repeated.
Nevertheless, the symbolic constitution of the work of art, to which I 
have referred above, could lead to the wrong conclusion that it represents 
the most appropriate means for constituting trans-subjective validity and, 
moreover, for conceptualizing the highest, metaphysical unity of the world. 
Of course, such a conjecture would automatically lead to an infringement 
of the Kantian autonomy of the work of art and to its mythologization. In 
the Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst, this rejectable version of aesthetic 
philosophy is connected with the »expressive theory« (Ausdruckstheorie) 
of art.25
As such cases Lukács considers Schelling’s26 and Hegel’s27 theories of art, 
to whose critique he dedicates long analyses in the chapter of the Heidel-
berger Ästhetik (1916–1918), characteristically entitled »Die transcendentale 
22 Ibid., p. 60, translation K. K. In the original: »Dadurch, daß die Form die des bestimmten Inhalts 
geworden ist, was soviel bedeutet, daß sie diesen Inhalt nicht nur zur Geltung erhebt, sondern 
von ihm nunmehr unabtrennbar wird [...]«.
23 Ibid, p. 172, translation K. K. In the original: »der Inhalt einen bestimmten Primat […] besitzt«, 
»Eine solche Überwindung der abstrakten Transcendenz der Form muß schon an und für sich 
den Formbegriff dem Ästhetischen nahebringen«.
24 Cf. Wirkus: Dialektik, pp. 107–108.
25 See the first chapter of the Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst with the characteristic title »Art 
as ›expression‹ [Germ. »Kunst als ›Ausdruck‹«] and the forms of notification of experienced 
reality« (Lukács: Heidelberger Philosophie, pp. 9–41). 
26 Cf. ibid., p. 16, 36.
27 Cf. ibid., p. 36.
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Dialektik der Schönheitsidee«.28 It is remarkable that in his Marxist opus 
magnum, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923), Lukács continues to 
consider the »truly critical, not metaphysically hypostatized artistic view of 
the world«29 as the main opponent of the mythologizing interpretation of 
the principle of art, referring indeed to his essay on the relation of subject 
and object in aesthetics.30
Whereas, as we saw above, for the critical approach art represents a 
world of fulfillment of man’s longings, this does not entail the reduction of 
the distance between the work of art and the man of everyday experienced 
reality. As Lukács explained in his Ästhetik, despite its self-completion and 
self-containment, the work of art is finally nothing but the scheme of every 
possible misunderstanding, since its symbolic nature is only the other side 
of the fact that it cannot have the communicative function of transmitting 
experiential contents.31
In the Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst, the idea of the misunder-
standing of art nourishes Lukács’s view on the tragedy of the artist, i.e. the 
view that artists finally remain without redemption and »more speechless 
[…] than everyday men who are trapped in themselves«, in spite of their 
attempt to express their most personal and individual experiences in a 
universal way.32 Thus, the deep »longing for community and unity with the 
others«,33 for »overcoming isolation«,34 cannot find a true solution in art. 
Despite the ›coincidentia oppositorum‹ within the work of art, the relation 
28 See Lukács: Heidelberger Ästhetik, pp. 133–224.
29 See Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, p. 215, n. 53 (»die wirklich kritische, nicht meta-
physisch hypostasierte, künstlerische Auffassung der Welt«, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, 
p. 154, n. 2). When Lukács describes the principle of art as the »creation of a concrete totality 
that springs from a conception of form which is precisely oriented towards the concrete content« 
(ibid., p. 137; »das Schaffen einer konkreten Totalität infolge einer Konzeption der Form, die 
gerade auf die konkrete Inhaltlichkeit ihres materiellen Substrats gerichtet ist«, Geschichte und 
Klassenbewusstsein, p. 151), while synoptically rejecting Schelling’s intellectual-mythologizing 
method (cf. ibid., p. 215, n. 52 and 53; Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, pp. 154–155, n. 1 and 
2) and making critical comments on the aesthetics of early German romanticism (cf. ibid, p. 215, 
n. 53; Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, pp. 154–155, n. 2), he simply repeats the conclusion 
of the sharp critique of the philosophical tendencies towards a metaphysical interpretation of 
the aesthetic principle he had formulated in his early Aesthetic.
30 See Lukács: Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung. This essay is identical to the third chapter of the Heidel-
berger Ästhetik (see Lukács: Heidelberger Ästhetik, pp. 91–132).
31 Cf. Hoeschen: Das ›Dostojewski‹-Projekt, p. 183, 188.
32 Lukács: Heidelberger Philosophie, p. 80, translation K. K. In the original: »daß sie stummer, 
unausgesprochener bleiben als die in sich eingesperrten Menschen des gewöhnlichen Lebens«.
33 Ibid., p. 15, translation K. K. In the original: »tieferen Sehnsucht nach Gemeinschaft und Einheit 
miteinander«.
34 Ibid., p. 35, translation K. K. In the original: »Aufhebung der Isoliertheit«.
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between art and ordinary empirical reality is finally »tragic«, given the fact 
that in art the »misunderstanding« that reigns in every communicative 
notification appears as »necessary, constitutive and, because of that, fruitful 
and blooming«.35
As has been aptly noted, »art transcends the alienation of life without 
abolishing it«, since it cannot »get rid of the inadequacy of interhuman 
communication which tends to isolate individuals«.36 We find the very same 
idea of an insuperable inadequacy in the Heidelberger Ästhetik, where Lukács 
describes the constitution of the normative subject of aesthetics in terms 
of the concept of pure experience, i.e. the specifically aesthetic-normative 
behavior of the subject vis-à-vis the aesthetic object,37 in which the normative 
subjectivity turns to the meaning, the value, without »losing its immediacy, 
its experiential character, its totality as an experiencing subject«.38 How-
ever, an abyss separates the pure experience of the internally homogenized, 
aesthetic »man ›wholly‹« (Mensch »ganz«) from the ordinary experience of 
the heterogeneous »whole man« (»ganzer Mensch«) of experienced reality.39
As has been noted in the relevant secondary bibliography, whereas from 
Lukács’s peculiar neo-Kantian point of view the work of art can be regarded 
as a »theodicy that can give meaning to the dissonance, the irrationality of 
reality« by representing the complete unity of form and content, it none-
theless leaves »the subjects excluded from redemption«, a fact that defines 
its »luciferian traits«.40 Indeed, the homogenization of the experiential abil-
ities of man »wholly« is internally linked with the luciferian (»luciferisch«) 
character of art,41 i.e. with the misleading constitution of a utopian world 
that leaves the real, alienated world intact.42
35 Ibid, p. 74, translation K. K. In the original: »notwendig, konstitutiv und infolgedessen fruchtbar 
und blühend«.
36 Márkus: Soul and Life, p. 106.
37 See Hoeschen: Das ›Dostojewski‹-Projekt, p. 195.
38 Lukács: Heidelberger Äthetik, p. 57, translation K. K. In the original: »darf dabei aber ihre Un-
mittelbarkeit, ihre Erlebnishaftigkeit, ihre Totalität als erlebendes Subjekt doch nicht verlieren«.
39 Cf. ibid., p. 58. As Lukács explains, the »man ›wholly‹ means [...] a reduction of man’s experi-
ential possibilities to completely determined, and in this determination, homogenized, inner 
organs of the reception of the world«, through which »a world built in relation to those organs, 
internally formed into a totality, can come to life fulfilled in his experience« (»Der Mensch ›ganz‹ 
bedeutet dann eine Reduktion der Erlebnismöglichkeiten des Menschen auf ganz bestimmte 
und in dieser Bestimmtheit homogen gewordene innere Organe der Aufnahme der Welt [...], 
durch welche Reduktion eine in Bezug auf diese Organe aufgebaute, innerlich zur Totalität 
gefügte Welt in seinem Erlebnis erfüllt aufleben kann.«, ibid., p. 100, translation K. K.).
40 Weisser: Georg Lukács’ Heidelberger Kunstphilosophie, p. 170.
41 Lukács refers to the »luciferian« character of art at the end of the chapter on Subjekt-Objekt-
Beziehung (cf. ibid., p. 132).
42 See Čačinovič-Puhovski: Lukács, p. 65.
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2. Lukács’s Early Critique of Ethics
Already in his pre-Marxist period, Lukács repeatedly showed the limits of ra-
tionalist ethical philosophy. His critique can be summarized as follows: Even if 
ethics can internally transform the subject according to its formal standards, on 
the level of ethical praxis the alienation of the subjective forms from the merely 
given external reality of experience reaches its highest point. By definition the 
ethical subject has a contingent relation to the empirical world, which has the 
power to completely frustrate the purest ethical intents. This problem emerges 
in Lukács’s early inquiries into different variations on the same basic theme, 
namely the insuperable opposition between the forms and life.
Firstly, in the essay on Kierkegaard from the collection Die Seele und 
die Formen, Lukács discusses Kierkegaard’s »honest« and »heroic« attempt 
»to create forms from life«, »to live what cannot be lived«.43 Kierkegaard’s 
gesture of appearing as a seducer by which he terminated his relationship 
with the much younger Regine Olsen is interpreted as »a movement which 
clearly expresses something unambiguous«.44 However, this ethical impulse 
towards the formation of life could only founder against the polysemous 
chaos of psychological experiences and opposing motives, the »most in-
substantial […] of all kingdoms […], the kingdom of psychology«.45 The 
continually changing and chaotic character of psychic life does not allow for 
the unambiguous connection of a signifier or a sign to a specific experience. 
Thus, the intersubjective validity of actions and/or communicative forms 
is undermined. The form cannot impose itself on the chaotic material of 
empirical life; it can blossom only in the field of art, where the »material«, 
i. e. human psychology, is determined ad hoc by the artist.46
Secondly, similar reflections can be found in the essay Von der Armut 
im Geiste (1912). Here Lukács does not content himself with showing the 
necessary foundering of form against life, but also harshly critiques ethical 
formation itself. The ethical work, i.e. the realization of duty, expresses what 
is clear, which nevertheless presupposes »that everything that had tied it 
to the earth is cut away«.47 In fact, the constitution of the universal norms 
43 Lukács: Soul and Form, p. 56 (»Formen schaffen aus dem Leben […] leben, was man nicht leben 
kann«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 88).
44 Ibid., p. 44 (»jene Bewegung, die das Eindeutige klar ausdrückt«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 
63).
45 Ibid., p. 56 (»und unter allen Reichen […] das im Innersten Bodenlose […] das Reich der 
Psychologie«, Die Seele und die Formen, p. 86).
46 Cf. ibid. (Die Seele und die Formen, pp. 86–87).
47 Lukács: On Poverty of the Spirit, p. 210 (Von der Armut am Geiste, p. 83).
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of an ethics of the Kantian type demands abstracting from all content of 
empirical life. For most people fulfilling their duty may then represent the 
»only possible exaltation of their lives«,48 but at the expense of blocking 
authentic human communication caused by the alienation of ethical form 
from the content of life. The »ethical work« is thus »a bridge that separates; 
a bridge upon which we go back and forth, always coming upon ourselves 
and never meeting one another«.49 Indeed, in his notes from this period 
Lukács referred to the inhuman character of Kantian ethics.50
Finally, Lukács offers a more elaborate version of his early critique of 
ethics in his neo-Kantian Heidelberger Philosophie der Kunst. Here, the 
ethical sphere appears to be constituted through its separation from the 
so-called experienced reality of the subject, to which ethics must conse-
quently return to actively intervene. According to Lukács, in opposition to 
the symbolic character of aesthetic formations ethics shows an allegorical 
constitution. As allegorical one should understand the inadequacy between 
the significance and the content which it organizes, i. e. the contingent and 
arbitrary relation between form and material. Thus, ethics
presupposes an alien and heterogeneous external world and a psychic reality that are 
confronted with its subject, the ethical-purified will, and it will be right to consider as 
inexistent anything that cannot be thought of as clearly opposite or as a mute obstacle to 
ethical action. For experience, however, all these will be present, and as they will – for 
experience – be inseparably mixed with the ethically precious and the ethically malefic, 
the ethical formations appear in experienced reality as inadequate, as external, in other 
words, as allegoric.51
As Lukács explains, the problem of ethics described in this quote does not 
pertain to the opposition between ethical norms and man’s natural inclina-
tions, but to the inertia of elements of life that, while remaining untouched 
by ethical decision, retain an indeterminate number of links with the subject 
and its life. Thus, the allegorical relation between the pure ethical form and 
the material of everyday life is a relation of total indifference and alienation.52 
48 Ibid., pp. 203–204 (Von der Armut am Geiste, p. 71).
49 Ibid., p. 204 (Von der Armut am Geiste, pp. 71–72).
50 Lukács: Heidelberger Notizen, p. 60.
51 Lukács: Heidelberger Philosophie, p. 86, translation K. K. In the original: »Diese setzt zwar eine 
ihrem Subjekt, dem ethisch-reingewordenen Willen, fremd und heterogen gegenüberstehende 
Außenwelt und seelische Wirklichkeit voraus, und wird mit vollem Recht alles, was nicht als 
dem ethischen Tun klar widerstrebend oder es dumpf hemmend gedacht werden kann, als nicht 
seiend betrachten. Für das Erleben aber wird all dies doch da sein, und da es – für das Erleben 
– mit dem ethisch Wertvollen und Wertfeindlichen unzerlegbar vermischt ist, erscheinen die 
ethischen Formungen in der Erlebniswirklichkeit als dieser unangemessen, äußerlich, mit einem 
Wort als allegorisch.«
52 Cf. ibid., pp. 85–86.
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As in the case of the aesthetic sphere, the similar alienating consequences of 
ethical formalism are also criticised in Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein.
In fact, in concordance with his early views, in the section of the Reifica-
tion essay on Fichte, Lukács briefly analyses how the inadequacy of form and 
content that characterizes the structure of the formal-rational relation of man 
and the world in general is repeated in the field of formalist ethical practice. 
As he points out, in Kant freedom is transformed into a ›point of view‹, from 
which the actions of the subject are considered. These same actions appear 
from another point of view, that of theoretical reason, as products of subjec-
tively independent, objective laws. Thus, the dualism of freedom and necessity 
is reproduced on a higher level and this separation of the two principles is 
conveyed to the subject splitting it into phenomenon and noumenon.
Consequently, Kantian ethics relies on the pure rational form, while 
its content depends on a world of phenomena that is alien to it.53 Ethics is, 
thus, obliged to find its content ready-made in the merely given reality.54 
A true way out of the vicissitudes of ethical formalism would presuppose 
the discovery of the »essence of the practical« that »consists in sublating 
that indifference of form towards content«.55 The distinctive characteristic of 
such a practical behavior is the fact that, instead of reproducing the given, 
it turns towards changing the world: »[T]he principle of the practical as the 
principle of changing the reality must be tailored to the concrete, material 
substratum of action, so as to affect it through its activation«.56 At any rate, 
this demand apparently lies beyond the scope of ethical practice.
3. Beyond Form: Lukács’s Practical Mysticism
Clearly discerning the insuperable dualism of the ethical formation of the 
world, Lukács searched for a solution. He distinguished the first ethic, the 
ethic of rational forms, from a mystical second ethic. The first ethic includes 
the »authentic ethic«, i. e. the subjective ethics of the Kantian type,57 as well as 
the Hegelian ethics of ethical life (Sittlichkeitsethik), i.e. the ethics of »rights 
53 Cf. Lukács: History and Class Consciousness, pp. 124–125 (Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein, 
pp. 137–138).
54 Ibid., p. 125 (Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein, p. 138).
55 Ibid. p. 126 (»das Wesen des Praktischen darin besteht: die Gleichgültigkeit der Form dem Inhalt 
gegenüber […] aufzuheben«, Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein, p. 139).
56 Ibid. (»Das Prinzip des Praktischen als Prinzip des Veränderns der Wirklichkeit muß deshalb auf 
das konkrete, materielle Substrat des Handelns zugeschnitten sein, um infolge seines Inkrafttretens 
auf dieses in solcher Weise einwirken zu können.«, History and Class Consciousness, p. 139).
57 Cf. Lukács: On Poverty of Spirit, p. 210 (Von der Armut am Geiste, p. 83).
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and duties that are derived from an ethically internalized institution«.58 In 
opposition to these two versions of ethical formation, the mystical »second 
ethic« totally overrides ethical forms. Even though it does not totally abolish 
them, it retains an »absolute priority«59 over them.
For this »metaphysical ethics«60 it becomes possible what for the first 
ethic is impossible: overcoming solipsism. The second ethic paves the way 
for authentic communication in the sense of a direct, unmediated contact 
of the souls. Therefore, it is characterized as the ethics of »soul-reality«, i.e. 
of that utopian situation which the young Lukács had planned to indirectly 
treat through the »formal analysis« of Dostoevsky’s works.61 Lukács never 
wrote this book apart from its introduction, which he published in 1916 
under the title Die Theorie des Romans. Relying on his notes for this book, 
it can be assumed that Lukács aspired to show that Dostoevsky can be read 
as the representative of a »new world« beyond the »age of absolute sinful-
ness«.62 Dostoevsky’s new world is precisely the utopian world of soul-reality.
In his short book on Béla Balázs of 191863 Lukács clarifies the significance 
of Dostoevsky’s utopia of »soul-reality as the authentic reality«,64 delimiting 
it against the merely contingent, conventional-social engagement of man:
[P]ositing soul-reality as the only reality means a radical shift in man’s sociological stance: 
on the level of soul-reality all these bonds through which  soul was normally bound to its 
social position, class, origin, etc., are separated from it and in their place new, concrete 
relations between soul and soul are put. The discovery of this world was Dostoevsky’s 
great achievement.65
In Dostoevsky Lukács finds a world free of sociological and psychological 
determinations that keep human souls bound to meaningless, social-cultural 
»formations of the objective spirit«.66 He finds a world without the solipsism 
of ordinary psychic life and without that of the ethics of duty. This world 
58 Lukács’s letter to Paul Ernst (on 4 May 1915), in: Lukács: Selected Correspondence, p. 248 (Brief-
wechsel 1902–1917, p. 352).
59 Ibid.
60 Which Lukács announced in a letter to Paul Ernst, in March 1915, in: ibid., p. 244 (Briefwechsel 
1902–1917, p. 345).
61 Lukács: Theory of the Novel, p. 152 (Theorie des Romans, p. 168).
62 As Lukács calls the modern epoch of Western civilization, using a category of Fichte’s philosophy 
of history (cf. Lukács: Theory of the Novel, pp. 152–153; »neue Welt«, »Epoche der vollendeten 
Sündhaftigkeit«, Theorie des Romans, pp. 167–168).
63 Balázs Béla és akiknek nem kell. The part of the text that interests us here was translated into 
German under the title »Béla Balázs: Tödliche Jugend« (see Lukács: Béla Balázs). 
64 Ibid., p. 154.
65 Ibid., p. 156.
66 Lukács’s letter to Paul Ernst (4 May 1915), in: Lukács: Selected Correspondence, p. 247 (Brief-
wechsel 1902–1917, p. 352).
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no longer depends on the power of the »bridge that separates«,67 on the 
power of the ethical-practical (normative or conventional) form, which is 
totally overridden. In his eyes, the persons in Dostoevsky’s novels are »nude 
concrete souls« due to a mystical »abolition of every form«.68
However, in opposition to Eastern mysticism, in which the abolition 
of forms and the unification with the divine simultaneously entails the ab-
olition of the concrete, finite relations between the souls, in Dostoevsky’s 
world overcoming forms and approaching the »non-social, non-empirical 
level of the soul’s arrival to itself« coincides with »a connection between 
people that is equally concrete with the empirical one; it is precisely […] an 
authentic ›living life‹, because it is the immediately experienced connection 
of concrete souls with the absolute«.69
The ›living life‹ represents the world of the realized ›second ethic‹. In this 
respect, the second ethic corresponds to a ›paracletic‹ (parakletisch) ethics of 
›goodness‹. As has been noted, this is a »communitarian ethics of personali-
ty«,70 in which every man’s way to his own soul passes through his relation with 
the others. According to Lukács’s typology of solidarity found in his notes on 
Dostoevsky, Russian solidarity – the model of his paracletic ethics – means that 
»the other is my brother; when I find myself, by finding myself, I find him«.71
In Lukács’s notes on Dostoevsky, it becomes apparent that the second 
ethic stands in absolute opposition to the first ethic of the »formations of the 
objective spirit«, i.e. the ethic that makes them »thing-like and metaphysi-
cal«. However, given the fact that »only the soul can possess metaphysical 
reality«, the question is posed, what must be done when the duties imposed 
by the social formations oppose the »imperatives of the soul«.72 Then, every 
concession to the authority of the formations is a »deadly sin against the 
spirit«. It is the sin »of German thought since Hegel’s time: offering meta-
physical consecration to every power«.73
The aim of Lukács’s ethics was not to eliminate social formations in 
a society of immediate brotherhood, as a frequent critique contends.74 Its 
aim was rather to change the relation of man to the institutions, to change 
the hierarchical order between the »rights and duties« stemming from the 
67 Lukács: On Poverty of Spirit, p. 204 (Von der Armut am Geiste, p. 71).
68 Lukács: Béla Balázs, p. 156.
69 Ibid., p. 157.
70 Fehér: Scheideweg, p. 311; Beiersdörfer: Max Weber, p. 83.
71 Lukács: Dostojewski, p. 181.
72 All quotes from: Lukács: Selected Correspondence, p. 248 (Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 352).
73 Lukács’s letter to Paul Ernst (14 April 1915), in: ibid., p. 246 (Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 349).
74 Cf., e.g., Arato/Breines: Young Lukács, pp. 70–71; Bermbach: Aufhebung. 
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institutions and the essential issues of the »soul« that always have priority.75 
Certainly, at the time of the First World War and the subsequent enormous 
increase in the power of oppressive institutions, the idea of their de-fetishi-
zation seemed particularly timely.76
Lukács also recognized that in these conditions it had no meaning to 
merely suggest a utopian ethics as the solution to world problems. The 
utopian vision of a new community could at most function as a »mystical 
doctrine of community as a reflection of redemption«.77 As soon as one ac-
knowledges that »there is no immediate health of the spirit«,78 the question 
of how to find an appropriate treatment must be posed.79 From this question 
a further version of second ethics emerges. It is the ethics of a »new man«, 
of the »Russian revolutionary who is sacrificed in the Christian way«.80 
According to Michael Löwy, this is a variation of the Russian mysticism 
of the community that takes on the form of an »authentic atheism«: »The 
most interesting point here is that the highest expression of such mystical 
atheism is seen in the Russian terrorist«.81
Hence, Lukács poses the »ethical problem of terrorism«82 and its »peculiar 
dialectical complications«.83 In terrorist action, we have »a new form of ap-
pearance of the old conflict between the first […] and the second ethics« that 
calls for a new ethico-philosophical comprehension: Out of love for humanity, 
the »political man, the revolutionary« turns against the »jehovistic« forma-
tions – as Lukács calls the fetishized social institutions of the Greek-Western 
world –, in this case against the state, aiming to abolish it. However, for ethical 
reasons emanating from the higher second ethic, he is compelled to infringe 
the prohibition of murder: »Here the soul must be sacrificed in order to save 
the soul: One must become a cruel Realpolitiker out of a mystical ethic and 
has to violate the absolute commandment: ›Thou shalt not kill‹«.84
75 Cf. Lukács: Selected Correspondence, p. 248 (Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 352).
76 Cf. Lukács’s letter to Paul Ernst (14 April 1915), in: Lukács: Selected Correspondence, p. 246 
(Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 349). During that time, Lukács strongly opposed chauvinism and 
militarism. In his letter to Ernst (4 May 1915) he characteristically noted that he considers »the 
modern practice of general conscription to be the vilest slavery that has ever existed« (ibid.; 
Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 352).
77 Lukács: Dostojewski, p. 182.
78 Ibid., p. 173.
79 Dannemann: Prinzip, p. 195.
80 Fehér: Scheideweg, p. 308.
81 Löwy: Georg Lukács, p. 119.
82 Lukács: Selected Correspondence, p. 245 (Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 348).
83 Ibid., p. 248 (Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 352).
84 All quotes from ibid. (Briefwechsel 1902–1917, p. 352).
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Next to the »paracletic« a »luciferic« (luciferisch) variant of the second 
ethic emerges.85 The »dialectical complication« that occurs in it refers to 
the tragedy of revolutionary action, to the sacrifice of the soul (»sacrificio 
del’ anima«)86 of the revolutionary, who is obliged to carry the burden of 
the guilt for acts of violence he performs for the sake of humanity. For, 
»[i]f the external shaping of the world has an ethical meaning«, then the 
problem of »ethical transcendence, political action« is posed.87 But »one 
cannot act without sin (but even not acting is an act = sin)«.88 Therefore, 
sin is unavoidable, since the revolutionary is conscious of his responsibil-
ity for the pains of all others.89 His choice retains all of its tragic character, 
given the fact that the luciferic second ethic does not rely upon an abstract 
ethical demand for subversive action that would make his responsibility for 
concrete persons a secondary issue.
In any case, Lukács knew that his luciferic second ethic revealed a sig-
nificant inadequacy: It was not able to offer directions, nor credible roads 
to social change. As Dannemann notes, Lukács’s ethic could not solve »the 
problem he had posed for himself, to reconcile the soul and the formations 
in a homogenous immediacy«.90 Neither paracletic goodness that remains 
within the inwardness of soul-reality nor the tragic activism of revolutio-
nary goodness can achieve the harmonization of the subject with objectivity 
– they end up reproducing the »ubiquitous dualism between internal and 
external world«.91
Lukács’s notes include only two hints at a possible solution to this 
problem that foreshadow his subsequent intellectual development. Firstly, 
he transcribes a quote from the introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philo-
sophy of Right (1843–1844), in which Marx alludes to the truly revolutionary 
atheism and comments on it positively as »Russian Feuerbachism«, refer-
ring to the necessary »program: disillusion« that will make man turn from 
religion to his own powers.92 Secondly, he points to a way of transcending 
the unavoidable restrictions of ethico-philosophical reflection by noting 
85 Cf. Lukács: Dostojewski, p. 176.
86 Ibid., p. 65.
87 Ibid., p. 129.
88 Ibid., p. 130.
89 Beiersdörfer highlighted the fact that this description of the »tragic« choice of the terrorist is 
unintelligible without involving Weber’s notion of the ethic of responsibility (cf. Beiersdörfer: 
Max Weber, pp. 88–96).
90 Dannemann: Prinzip, pp. 196–197.
91 Ibid, p. 197.
92 Lukács: Dostojewski, pp. 79–80, 128.
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that the knowledge of the »true structure of objective spirit« depends on 
the philosophy of history: »here lies the significance of Marx«.93
4. Lukács’s Turn to Revolutionary Praxis
In the years that followed the publication of The Theory of the Novel (1916), 
Lukács continued to discuss the problems of his second ethic in the »Sunday 
circle« he formed at the end of 1915.94 However, his public interventions in 
1918 were confined to the frame of »progressive politics« with neo-Kan-
tian fundaments. This holds true for his »Contribution to a Discussion on 
Conservative and Progressive Idealism«, which he presented at a public dis-
cussion on progressive politics, organized by the Society of Social Sciences, 
in March and April 1918, in Budapest,95 as well as for his article Bolshevism 
as a Moral Problem (1918), which he published shortly before joining the 
Communist Party. In this article, he explicitly distanced himself from revo-
lutionary action, arguing that it is humanly impossible to foresee all the 
ethical consequences of a violation of the rules of democratic politics. Thus, 
the revolutionary tactic for changing the world compels the individual to 
confront an »insoluble ethical problem« since it relies on the »metaphysical 
assumption that good can issue from evil«.96
Lukács’s vacillation ended at the end of 1918, when he became a member 
of the newly founded Hungarian Communist Party. This shift ceases to seem 
so »sudden«97 if one takes into account that, in his notes on Dostoevsky, 
Lukács had already located the possibility of a mediation between revolu-
tionary action and reality. In fact, following his note on the historico-phi-
losophical knowledge of the objective spirit I alluded to at the end of the 
previous section, Lukács integrated revolutionary action and its tragedy 
into the wider framework of a new concept of objectivity, thus suggesting a 
new solution to the problem of human alienation.
Shortly after his engagement with the Communist Party, in the first 
months of 1919, Lukács developed relevant reflections in his essay Tactics 
93 Ibid., p. 90.
94 On the »Sunday circle«, see particularly: Karádi: Einleitung, pp. 16–17; Bendl: Zwischen Heirat, 
pp. 36–37. 
95 For the Hungarian Society of Social Sciences and its activity, cf. Kettler: Culture, pp. 41–47. For 
Lukács’s intervention in this specific discussion, cf. Karádi: Einleitung, p. 19. 
96 Lukács: Bolshevism, p. 220 (Bolschewismus, p. 33).
97 As was characterized by Anna Lesznai, a close friend of Lukács from the ›Sunday circle‹, in a 
private discussion with David Kettler (cf. Kettler: Culture, p. 69).
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and Ethics.98 Very briefly, here for the first time, Lukács introduces the 
concept of ›class consciousness‹ as that form of knowledge of the historical 
process in the framework of which »the subject and the known object are 
homogeneous in respect to their essence«.99 The so-called »historico-phi-
losophical consciousness« is a kind of practical knowledge that pertains to 
the tendencies of class struggle, i.e. to the objective possibility of establish-
ing an emancipated society.100 Indeed, it is constituted on the basis of the 
Hegelian dialectic and has, thus, a holistic character.101 Whatever the inad-
equacies in the dialectical constitution of Lukács’s early understanding of 
the historico-philosophical consciousness might be,102 it is clear that in the 
first months of 1919, he had already started to work out the basic idea of 
the theory of class consciousness he would develop in the following years.
However, in Tactics and Ethics the continuity to Lukács’s early reflections 
on the ethical dilemmas of revolutionary action is apparent. In spite of the 
weight ascribed to the mediating historico-philosophical consciousness for 
choosing the right political engagement, Lukács equally emphasizes the 
question on the relation of »conscience« and the »sense of responsibility« of 
the individual with »the problem of the tactically correct collective action«. 
For Lukács, these two levels are closely interwoven, as taking the individual 
responsibility for the realization of the objectively possible utopian goal can be 
avoided no longer, »once the purely ethically motivated action of the individual 
brings him into the field of politics«. Then, »its objective (historico-philo-
sophical) correctness«103 must be judged on the basis of class consciousness 
that »must raise itself above the level of its merely real facticity and reflect 
its world-historical mission and the consciousness of its responsibility«.104
In view of the historico-philosophical consciousness, no one can avoid 
taking the responsibility for a possible new world, neither the one who is 
for the revolution nor the one who is for the perpetuation of the existing 
regime. Therefore, Lukács notes that moral conscience is confronted with the 
demand that the individual »must act as if the changing of the world’s destiny 
98 This text was initially published as a brochure of the commissariat of education (in which Lukács 
held the position of deputy commissar of the people) in May 1919, about two months after the 
proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic on the March 21 of the same year. 
99 Lukács: Tactics, p. 15, n. 2 (Taktik, p. 58, n. 2).
100 Cf. ibid., pp. 9–10 (Taktik, p. 51–52).
101 Cf. ibid., pp. 19–24 (Taktik, pp. 63–64, 66–68, 70).
102 Commentators detect a one-sided emphasis on the voluntarist dimension of social change in 
Lukács’s first Marxist texts. Cf. e. g. Schmidt: Concrete Totality, pp. 17–18; Arato/Breines: Young 
Lukács, pp. 85–88; Löwy: Georg Lukács, pp. 148–149, 173–174. 
103 All quotes from: Lukács: Tactics, p. 7 (Taktik, p. 49).
104 Ibid., p. 9 (Taktik, p. 51).
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depended on his action or inaction«.105 Here, it is not difficult to recognize 
reflections formulated in the notes on Dostoevsky on the responsibility of 
everyone for all others, from which the revolutionary is not exempted, nor 
is it the social-democratic proponent of a gradual social change that would 
amount to the continuation of barbarism for an indefinite period of time.106
By taking recourse on class consciousness, Lukács reverses the »ethic of 
responsibility« we met in Bolshevism as a Moral Problem. The behavior that 
realizes imperatives derived from the historico-philosophical consciousness 
is now responsible and not the one that persists with abstract, universal du-
ties within a given social-historical context. In the terminology of the notes 
on Dostoevsky, one could say that in the conflict between the first and the 
second ethic the primacy belongs to the latter.107 Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that the use of violence is really ›justified‹ on the level of the individual 
ethical conscience of the revolutionary. On the contrary, as is also the case 
in the »luciferic second ethic« of the terrorist, in the communist political 
engagement the individual confronts an authentically tragic dilemma to 
which it is compelled to answer through the sacrifice of its moral conscience 
for the sake of realizing the objectively possible, collective goal.108
Such reflections of the individual moral decision of the revolutionary 
were rapidly displaced by that part of the theory which already played the 
role of the mediating third between the ethical subject and reality: the theory 
of class consciousness. What remains from Lukács’s early mystical ethics 
In History and Class Consciousness is only the conviction that the solution 
to the problem of alienation cannot be theoretical but only practical, in the 
sense of practically changing the social formations and man’s relation to 
them. Only now, the issue is no longer about the individual, but the collec-
tive praxis; the only one that allows the possibility of a harmonization of 
subject and object, form and content, freedom and necessity. The mystical 
ethics has now been replaced by a theory of the conscious political practice 
of self-determination of a collective subject.
105 Ibid., p. 8 (Taktik, p. 50).
106 Cf. ibid. (Taktik, p. 50).
107 In his recollections from the time of the Soviet Republic, József Lengyel notes that, in the hotel 
in which the members of the revolutionary government stayed, the group around Lukács was 
known as the »ethicists«, who had long discussions – with references to Dostoevsky and Hebbel’s 
Judith – on the idea that the communists’ mission, like Judas, is to carry the sins of the world 
to save it from evil (cf. Lengyel: Visegráder, pp. 244–246; also: Kettler: Culture, pp. 75–76). 
108 Cf. Lukács: Tactics, pp. 10–11 (Taktik, p. 53).
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5. Conclusion: A New Concept of Form
With his turn to Marxism, Lukács definitely realized the inadequacy of all 
ethico-philosophical attempts to solve the problem of the indifference of 
social formations and conventions towards the individual subject. A radi-
cal philosophy of praxis would need another notion of practice, beyond 
individual ethical practice. The solution Lukács searched for lies beyond 
the problems raised in Tactics and Ethics; however in a direction that had 
already been opened up by this text: The dualism of ought and being can be 
overcome only through a holistic theory of social-historical reality in unity 
with a practice that »is in essence the penetration and transformation of 
reality«.109 This dual, theoretical and practical penetration of reality cannot 
be achieved by the individual subject, but only by »a subject which is itself 
a totality«.110 This subject is the class.
Espousing the standpoint of class in matters of knowledge and practice 
presupposes a theory that stands in lively interaction with the ›historical-di-
alectical process‹. It is exactly this meeting of theory and history which is 
represented, according to Lukács, by Marx’s conceptualization of man as 
»simultaneously the subject and object of the socio-historical process«, of 
man »as a social being«.111 This notion of historical materialism that being is 
the »hitherto unconscious product of human activity«112 is itself a historical 
product: It became possible for the first time in the capitalist epoch, when 
the postulate of the formal equality of men destroyed the previous ›natural‹ 
social bonds and, above all, gave birth to a new social class, the proletariat.113 
As Lukács notes elsewhere, »the proletariat is the first, and until now, the 
only subject in the course of history for which this perception is valid«.114 
Obviously, for Lukács after 1918, the holistic theory of history and class 
consciousness, tentatively crystallized in History and Class Consciousness,115 
was supposed to offer the resolution of the difficulties of the notion of form 
he had searched for in his pre-Marxist period.
109 Lukács: History, p. 39 (»ihrem Wesen nach ein Durchdringen, ein Verwandeln der Wirklichkeit«, 
Geschichte, p. 51).
110 Ibid. (»ein Subjekt, das selbst Totalität ist«, Geschichte, p. 51).
111 Ibid., p. 19 (»gleichzeitiges […] Subjekt und Objekt des gesellschaftlich-geschichtlichen Ge-
schehen. […] als Gesellschaftswesen«, Geschichte, p. 33).
112 Ibid. (»bisher freilich unbewußtes Produkt menschlicher Tätigkeit«, Geschichte, p. 33).
113 Cf. ibid., pp. 19–20 (Geschichte, pp. 33–34).
114 Lukács: Tailism, p. 53 (Chvostismus, p. 11).
115 For a thorough reconstruction of it, see: Kavoulakos: Georg Lukács’s Philosophy.
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